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RECENT DECISIONS

CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS - PRICE REGULATION - PROHIBITION OF SALES BELOW CosT - Defendant was indicted for alleged violation of the Pennsylvania Fair Sales Act,1 which prohibits the "advertisement,
offer for sale, or sale of any merchandise at less than cost by retailers or wholesalers," and makes violation of the act a misdemeanor. His motion to quash
the indictment was sustained by the court of the quarter sessions 2 and affirmed
by the superior court,8 and the state appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

1
2
8

73 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939), §§ 201-207.
86 Pitt. Leg. J. 597 (1938).
137 Pa. Super. 96, 8 A. (2d) 801 (1939).
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Held, affirming, that the statute violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it is not within the power of the state to prohibit sales
below cost in general but only those designed for predatory purposes. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. (2d) 67 (1940).
Statutory prohibition of sales below cost is one aspect of legislative attempts
to control unfair business practices.4 Many states have enacted statutes prohibiting below cost sales made with intent to injure, or with the effect of injuring,
competition, 5 and these statutes generally have been held a valid exercise of the
police power. 6 But a few states, like Pennsylvania in the instant case, have
enacted statutes prohibiting sales below cost with or without an intent to injure,
or with or without the effect of injuring, competition,1 and these statutes consistently have been held invalid.8 The Pennsylvania court, however, is the only
court which has held that such a statute is in direct violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution by virtue of its deprivation of the
right of free disposition of property.9 This conclusion was not inevitable, however. In the light of the "hands-off" doctrine of the United States Supreme
Court,10 one could argue that the legislature had chosen means it felt reason4 Naturally, legislative control of unfair business practices takes many forms:
antitrust acts, antiprice-discrimination acts, and similar laws. This note deals only with
statutes prohibiting sales below cost.
5 Of these there are at least thirty-one: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan (bakery and petroleum industries), Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 2 C. C. H~, TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 8th ed., 9002 et seq.
(1941).
6 II8 A. L. R. 506 (1939).
1 States which have had or still have such statutes include Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Nebraska, Louisiana and Idaho. The Pennsylvania, Nebraska and New Jersey
courts have overthrown them. As far as is known, the Louisiana and Idaho courts have
not had occasion to consider them.
8 n8 A. L. R. 506 (1939); State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281
N. W. 607 (1938); State on complaint of Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123
N. J. L. 180, 8 A. (2d) 291 (1939).
9 The Nebraska court overthrew the Nebraska statute because it did not set up
a sufficient standard of guilt. The New Jersey court held the New Jersey statute to be
in violation of the state constitution for the same reason. However, both the Nebraska
and New Jersey courts seemed concerned about an unreasonable invasion of sacrosanct
property rights. The Pennsylvania court, discussing also the indefiniteness of the
statutory offense, was more disturbed about the blanket prohibitions of the act, about
the absence of reasonable relation between the means and end of the statute. The
court overthrew the legislative conclusion that general prohibition of sales below cost
(without regard to effect or intent) was reasonably related to the elimination of unfair
selling practices, "loss leaders," etc., which tended toward monopoly, cutthroat competition, and other abuses.
10 The Pennsylvania court, in the instant case, relied on Fairmount Creamery v.
Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 506 (1927), where it was held that a Minnesota
statute, forbidding price discrimination between localities in the buying and selling of
milk, cream or butter, was unconstitutional because "it clearly and unmistakably in-
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ably related to the elimination of certain admittedly evil business practices, and
that a court, in the absence of other facts, 11 should not overthrow this legislative
conclusion of reasonable relation. Strength could be added to this argument
by urging ( l) that state control of unfair selling practices becomes easier, if not
more efficient, when the prosecution is relieved of proving predatory purpose or
evil effect, and ( 2) that the obvious cases of harmless sales below cost are specifically exempted from the prohibitions of the statute by the statute itself.12
The Pennsylvania court, however, based its decision also on the absence of a
clear standard of guilt in the Pennsylvania act. A criminal statute must set up
a clear standard of guilt. When a fair sales act requires an intent to injure,
or the effect of injuring, competition, courts generally hold that such a standard
obtains. But when an act does not require a guilty intent or evil effect, the
courts, feeling a judicial inability properly to define cost and sale-below-cost,
hold a sufficient standard does not obtain. Explanation of this dichotomy may
be that the requirement of a guilty intent or evil effect does two main things:
( l ) removes the doubt as to the reasonable relation between the means and
purpose of the statute and ( 2) helps establish a sufficiently clear standard of
guilt. At first blush it might seem that the requirement of guilty intent or evil
effect could have little to do with establishing a clear standard of guilt, since
vagueness of cost definitions and difficulties of defining a sale-below-cost would
seem to be present whether or not a fair sales act requires an intent to injure, or
the effect of injuring, competition. Nevertheless it is important to note that
courts, when holding fair sales acts constitutional, treat the gravamen of the
offense as an unfair business practice, an intent to injure competition, or an
actual injury thereto.18 And they cannot do this when considering statutes outfringes private rights." But, Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissented, and, as has been
suggested elsewhere, the dissenters have become the majority of the court. In Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 at 539, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934), the Supreme Court
(McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler dissenting) through Justice
Roberts, said, "Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only
if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free
to adopt."
11
A court would not deny a defendant the right to prove lack of reasonable
relation between the prohibitions and purpose of a statute. The language of Justice
Roberts in the Nebbia case suggests that this is what the defendant should do before a
court should overthrow the legislative conclusion of reasonable relation.
12
Certain types of sales are exempted: namely, bona fide clearance sales advertised as such; sales of perishable merchandise made in order to forestall loss; sales
of merchandise which is imperfect, damaged, or being discontinued, and so advertised;
sales of merchandise for charitable purposes; sales by an officer under direction of a
court; and sales "where the price of merchandise is made to meet the legal price of a
competitor for merchandise of the same grade, quality, and quantity." 73 Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1939), § 205.
18
Said the California court in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National
Candy & Tobacco Co., II Cal. (2d) 634 at 658, 82 P. (2d) 3 ( 1938): "It must be
borne in mind that this statute does not regulate the selling of commodities-it is the
predatory trade practice of selling below cost with intent to injure competitors which
the legislature on reasonable grounds has determined is vicious and unfair that is
prohibited."
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lawing sales below cost without regard to intent or effect. In these latter cases
the court's emphasis must shift to i treatment of the crux of the offense as the
selling below cost in and of itself. In attempting this approach the Pennsylvania
court ran into complex definitions and vague exemptions.14 Apparently the
legislatures cannot cure the defect of no clear standard of guilt without making
the gravamen of the offense an intended or actual injury to competition.15
George W. Loomis

14 Because definitions of cost and sale-below-cost are usually very complex, they
number among the chief reasons why the statutes have been held not to establish a
clear standard of guilt. But probably the main obstacle to finding a clear standard of
of guilt in the Pennsylvania statutes is the exempted sale-below-cost "to meet the legal
price of a competitor for merchandise of the same grade, quality, and quantity." 73
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939), § 205. Indeed, how could one know whether he were
meeting a legal or an illegal sale of a competitor?
15 In making the gravamen of the offense an intended or actual injury to competition, the legislatures induc;e the courts to relax their strict standards as to the
factual crime picture. But the important question arises whether or not the legislatures
can satisfy strict requirements of standard of guilt by clear definitions of cost and selling
below cost without adding the requirement of guilty intent or evil effect. As yet the
courts have not thought they could. However, the courts which have decided this have'
been influenced by the idea that there is also an unwarranted invasion of property
rights. See note 9, supra.
For other material dealing with statutory prohibitions of sales below cost, see 47
YALE L. J. 1201 (1938); 32 ILL. L. REV. 816 (1938); 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
222 (1939); 52 HARV. L. REv. II42 (1939); Oler, "Statutory Inhibition Against
Sales Below Cost," 43 DICK. L. REv. II2 (1939); 5 UNiv. NEWARK L. REv. 172
(1940).

